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Abstract 
Objective: This research investigates the role played by household financial organization in 
configuring the housework participation of women and men and in moderating the influence 
of earnings on housework.  
Background: Existing research has focused on the ways in which earnings shape gendered 
power and housework performance in couple relationships. However, no research has 
examined how household financial organization intervenes between the receipt of earnings in 
the labor market and the performance of housework at home.  
Method: Two-stage least squares regressions were used to analyze data from Waves 2 and 4 
of the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (N = 6,070 couples).  
Results: Management of household finances is associated with an increase in housework 
time for both men and women, whereas control of household financial decisions reduces 
men’s but not women’s housework time. Women’s individual earnings reduce their 
housework time only when they can access these earnings. Supporting both resource 
bargaining theory and gendered resources theory, men’s relative earnings reduce their 
housework time when they or their partners manage the couple’s earnings, but not when 
partners manage their earnings independently. Women’s individual earnings and men’s 
relative earnings reduce their housework time only when they have partial or full control of 
household financial decisions.  
Conclusion: The management and control of household finances influence the time spent by 
women and men on housework in ways distinct from yet equally as important as those of 
earnings. Household financial organization is a key premise moderating when and how 
gender equality in the public sphere helps promulgate gender equality at home. 
Keywords: Gender, Housework, Inequalities, Marital Power, Money Management, Two-
Stage Least Squares Regression.  
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The unequal division of housework tells of marital power in couple relationships and it 
remains a highly contested area of the ongoing gender revolution (Davis & Greenstein, 
2013). Despite considerable progress toward gender equality in education and the labor 
market (Gerson, 2009), women in many countries still spend substantially more time on 
housework than their male counterparts (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Hu & Yucel, 2018). The 
relationship between money and gendered housework participation has attracted particular 
attention from scholars (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Carlson & 
Lynch, 2017; Chesley & Flood, 2017; Gupta, 2006, 2007; Kan, 2008; Killewald, 2011). 
Money underpins the complex organization of social relations within and between the public 
and domestic spheres (Palh, 1990; 1995). It reflects and informs the unequal distribution of 
power between the sexes (Becker, 1991; Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Vogler, 
1998, 2005). Against this backdrop, money provides a pertinent lens for examining why 
gender equality in the public sphere does or does not help promulgate gender-equal 
housework participation at home. 
Building on the tradition of resources and marital power (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; 
Rodman, 1972), existing theories—notably resource bargaining (Brines, 1994; Lundberg & 
Pollak, 1996), gendered resources (Tichenor, 1999; Zuo & Bian, 2001), and individual 
autonomy (Gupta, 2006, 2007)—have fertilized a growing body of research on the impact of 
money on gendered housework performance. Nevertheless, existing research has been limited 
by a tendency to focus on the generation of earnings (Bittman et al., 2003; Gupta, 2007; Kan, 
2008; Killewald, 2011), with scarce attention to the organization of household finances. 
Nearly three decades after Pahl’s (1989) ground-breaking study of household financial 
organization and its implications for conjugal power, intra-household economy remains a 
“black box” in research on gendered housework participation. If money embodies power 
(Gupta, 2007; Pahl, 1989; Zelizer, 1994), household financial organization—the management 
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of earnings and control of financial decisions—is key to a full understanding of how such 
power is distributed and operates between partners (Bennett, 2013; Pahl, 1990, 1995; Vogler, 
1998, 2005; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). 
To remedy the above limitation and to provide a full understanding of the relationship 
between money, marital power and housework, this study theorizes and empirically tests the 
role played by household financial organization—i.e., financial management and decision 
making—in shaping the housework time of women and men and in moderating the influence 
of individual and relative earnings on housework. To account for potential reciprocal 
relationships between money and housework (Carlson & Lynch, 2017), specifically the 
possibility that housework also shapes market earnings (Cooke & Hook, 2018), I use 
instrumental variables two-stage least squares (2SLS) models to aid causal identification. The 
empirical analysis draws on data from Waves 2 (2010–2012) and 4 (2012–2014) of the 
United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS, www.understanding 
society.ac.uk). The findings call into question the taken-for-granted link between earnings 
and housework. I underline the role played by financial organization, over and above 
earnings, in shaping the time spent by women and men on housework. I show that financial 
organization is a crucial premise conditioning when and how individual and relative earnings 
influence the housework participation of women and men. The findings refine resource 
theories and contribute to the marital power literature by uncovering the gendered ways in 
which the generation and mobilization of resources jointly configure power between partners. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Money and Housework: Household Financial Organization as the Missing Link 
Research on the relationship between money and housework has tended to consider money as 
a unidimensional construct, in terms of earnings or wage (Bittman et al., 2003; Carlson & 
Lynch, 2017; Gupta, 2007; Kan, 2008; Killewald, 2011). A separate line of scholarship has 
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emphasized the importance of control of resources and decision-making authority in shaping 
marital power (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Lundberg & Pollak, 1996; Pepin, 2019; Rodman, 
1972; Tichenor, 1999), which is crucial to the negotiation of domestic labor division (Bianchi 
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, how intra-household financial organization influences partners’ 
housework participation remains an open empirical question. Partners’ decision to pool their 
earnings or to maintain financial independence and their control of household financial 
decisions tell of the checks and balances of power between partners (Pahl, 1990; Pepin, 2019; 
Tichenor, 1999; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Vogler (1998, p. 691) argued that “the ways in 
which couples organize money within the family has an independent effect on power, over 
and above the resources each person contributes.” Financial organization also serves as a 
major medium through which money “talks” in couple relationships (Pahl, 1989, 1990; 
Vogler, 2005), and may thus moderate when and how earnings translate into power (Bennett, 
2013; Pahl, 1995).  
Two crucial processes intervene between partners’ receipt of earnings in the labor 
market and the intra-household inequalities resulting from these earnings (Bennett, 2013). 
The first is partners’ management of earnings (Pahl, 1995; Pepin, 2019; Vogler, 1998). Three 
major systems of financial management exist (Bisdee, Daly, & Price, 2013; Pahl, 1990; 
Vogler, 2005): pooling, whole-wage, and independent. In the pooling system, partners share 
most or all of their earnings. This system often reflects partners’ interdependence (Kenney, 
2006; Pahl, 1990, 1995). Although both partners have access to a joint pool of earnings, their 
differentiated contributions to the pool may become a source of unequal bargaining power 
(Bennett, 2013). In the whole-wage system, one partner takes charge of the family’s finances 
and the other hands over his or her earnings, retaining only a small amount of personal 
spending money or a housekeeping allowance (Bisdee et al., 2013; Vogler, 1998). Due to 
their restricted nature, personal spending money and housekeeping allowances often reflect a 
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lack of power and a sense of deprivation in couple relationships (Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). In 
the independent system, partners retain their respective earnings, sometimes pooling a small 
portion to establish a joint housekeeping allowance (Ashby & Burgoyne, 2009; Pahl, 1995). 
Within this system, each partner is usually economically self-sufficient (Vogler, 2005), 
resulting in a low level of interdependence between partners (Ashby & Burgoyne, 2009). 
Second, as the value of money is projected through its potential use (Himmelweit, 
Santos, Sevilla, & Sofer, 2013; Zelizer, 1994), control of financial decisions constitutes 
another key dimension of household financial organization. Having a say in household 
financial decisions reflects one’s control of money (Himmelweit et al., 2013), which may 
confer individuals with marital power and facilitate one’s mobilization of money in the 
negotiation of domestic arrangements (Kenney, 2006; Rodman, 1972; Vogler, 1998). 
Partners who make joint financial decisions tend to have equal opportunities to derive power 
from the couple’s earnings (Himmelweit et al., 2013; Vogler, 2005), although the level of 
power each can derive may still be influenced by his or her relative contribution to the 
couple’s income (Kenney, 2006; Pahl, 1989; Vogler, 1998). Conversely, a lack of control of 
household financial decisions reflects not only a compromised bargaining position, but also 
limited capability to derive power from earnings (Bennett, 2013).  
Resource Bargaining Theory  
From the social exchange perspective (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), family interactions are 
analogous to socio-economic exchanges in a marketplace (Becker, 1991). Specifically, 
resource bargaining theory postulates that partners’ differentiated participation in paid labor 
confers greater power on the partner with higher earnings to “bargain out” of housework 
(Becker, 1991; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994). Bargaining power derived from relative 
earnings is constructed largely in the shadow of union dissolution (Bittman et al., 2003): a 
partner who is economically dependent on the other may be less able to support himself or 
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herself and thus more vulnerable in the event of separation (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996). 
Against this backdrop, managing the household’s finances may help to mitigate the 
perception of precarity by fostering a sense of financial security (Pahl, 1989, 1990). Although 
some scholars have argued that physically taking hold of the couple’s earnings may enable 
one to access a more favorable bargaining position (Himmelweit, 2013), others have 
expressed doubt as to the extent to which financial management directly confers bargaining 
power (Pahl, 1995; Vogler, 1998). If one partner is able to derive bargaining power from 
managing the couple’s earnings, household financial management will reduce that partner’s 
housework time, as stated in Hypothesis 1A. In addition, research has clearly shown that 
control of household financial decisions both results from and reflects the possession of 
bargaining power (Himmelweit et al., 2013; Pahl, 1989, 1991, 1995; Vogler, 1998, 2005), 
which may help reduce one’s housework time, as specified in Hypothesis 1B. 
Hypothesis 1A: Management of the couple’s earnings reduces one’s housework time.  
Hypothesis 1B: Control of household financial decisions reduces one’s housework 
time.   
The management of the couple’s earnings and control of household financial 
decisions may bolster the influence of relative earnings on housework by reinforcing the 
dominant bargaining position of major earners (Pahl, 1995; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). 
Conversely, a lack of management and control of household finances may undermine the 
bargaining position derived from relative earnings (Pahl, 1989; Vogler, 2005). As 
dependence between partners is a key premise of resource bargaining theory (Becker, 1991), 
it may be impossible to derive bargaining power from relative earnings when little exchange 
occurs between partners. Focusing on British couples, Pahl (1989, 1995) and Vogler (2005) 
found that partners who managed their finances independently tended to be economically 
self-sufficient, and that their lack of interdependence rendered them less susceptible to the 
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threat of union dissolution. Therefore, the management of household finances and the control 
of financial decisions, respectively, may moderate the influence of relative earnings on 
housework, as specified in Hypotheses 1C and 1D. 
Hypothesis 1C: Relative earnings reduce individuals’ housework time when they 
manage all or part of the couple’s earnings, but not when their partners manage the 
couple’s earnings or partners manage their earnings independently.  
Hypothesis 1D: Relative earnings have a greater effect in reducing individuals’ 
housework time when they have greater control of household financial decisions. 
Gendered Resources Theory 
Compared with resource bargaining theory, gendered resources theory offers a more 
optimistic view of couple relationships. Instead of highlighting the possibility of union 
dissolution, it underlines the contribution of resource exchange between partners to the 
solidarity of couple units (Tichenor, 1999; Zuo & Bian, 2001). Specifically, the notion of 
gender specialization posits that men and women are channeled into paid and unpaid work 
(Becker, 1991) and bound together by the provision of distinctive gender resources (e.g., 
earnings or domestic work) to maximize the utility of the unitary couple unit (Bennett, 1993; 
Tichenor, 1999). Although both gendered resources theory and resource bargaining theory 
postulate that relative earnings reduce one’s housework participation, their underlying 
assumptions are substantively different. Whereas competition for control is central to the 
generation of bargaining power, gendered resources theory underlines the ethos of 
cooperation between partners (Zuo & Bian, 2001). 
The responsibility for financial management may be exchanged as a gendered task 
(Bennett, 2013; Vogler, 1998, 2005). The everyday management of household finances, such 
as settling bills and keeping bank accounts in check, is a chore that takes time in itself. 
Balancing the books and making ends meet often entail one’s direct involvement in 
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consumption activities such as grocery shopping (Vogler, 1998, 2005). Additionally, 
financial management, particularly among women, often correlates with the performance of 
other routine housework tasks (Bisdee et al., 2013; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). As a result, 
breadwinners sometimes strategically offload financial management onto their housekeeping 
partners (Pahl, 1990). Thus, the management of a couple’s earnings may increase rather than 
reduce one’s housework time (Pahl, 1990, 1995; Vogler, 1998), as specified in Hypothesis 
2A (vs. 1A).  
Hypothesis 2A: Individuals spend more time on housework when they manage the 
couple’s earnings, compared with when their partners manage part or all of the 
couple’s earnings. 
Financial management is a crucial medium for the exchange of gendered resources 
(Becker, 1991; Bennett, 2013; Vogler, 1998, 2005). As earners hand over their market 
earnings to their partners, the partners validate the contract of exchange by performing 
unpaid domestic labor in return (Zuo & Bian, 2001). The exchange fosters a sense of 
cohesion and perceived fairness in couple relationships (Hu & Yucel, 2018; Tichenor, 1999). 
In contrast to the resource bargaining argument that one seizes power by managing the 
couple’s earnings, the transfer of earnings between partners may enable earners to “exchange 
out” (rather than “bargain out”) of housework (Tichenor, 1999; Zuo & Bian, 2001). If 
gendered resources theory holds true, earnings may have little exchange value when partners 
manage their earnings independently (Zuo & Bian, 2001). These considerations lead to 
Hypothesis 2B. 
Hypothesis 2B: Relative earnings reduce one’s housework time when one’s partner 
manages part or all of the couple’s earnings, but not when one manages all of the 
couple’s earnings or partners manage their earnings independently.  
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However, gendered resources theory may not similarly apply to control of financial 
decisions, as prior research has shown that individuals lose rather than gain power when they 
relinquish control of financial decisions (Bennett, 2013; Himmelweit et al., 2013; Vogler, 
2005), which concurs with the prediction derived from resource bargaining theory discussed 
in the previous section. 
Autonomy Theory 
Autonomy theory posits that partners’ social behaviors may be driven by individual interests 
rather than by the couple’s communal benefits, particularly given the rise of individualism 
and decline of familism (Beck & Beck-Gersheim, 2002). Irrespective of their partners’ 
earnings, therefore, individuals may be able to derive autonomous power from their own 
earnings (Gupta, 2006, 2007). The negative association between individual earnings and 
housework participation has received empirical support in recent studies of women (Gupta, 
2006, 2007; Killewald & Gough, 2010; Usdansky & Parker, 2011). Two mechanisms 
underpin autonomy theory: “buying out” and “opting out” (Killewald, 2011). The former 
suggests that market earnings can be used to purchase substitute services such as domestic 
outsourcing (Carlson & Lynch, 2017; Killewald, 2011). The latter suggests that individuals 
do not necessarily replace their domestic responsibilities; high earners may simply forgo 
housework if they deem the economic returns to domestic work to be less favorable than 
those to paid work (Killewald, 2011). High earners may also create less domestic demand as 
they spend less time at home (Gupta, 2007).  
The implicit assumption of autonomy theory is that individuals have access to their 
own earnings (Gupta, 2006; Killewald, 2011). Highly individualized partners are more likely 
to manage their finances independently than to jointly manage household finances or 
relinquish the management of earnings to their partners (Vogler, 2005). The additional sense 
of autonomy derived from independent financial management, over and above the effect of 
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individual earnings, may help to reduce individuals’ housework time (Vogler, 1998, 2005), as 
specified in Hypothesis 3A.  
Hypothesis 3A: Individuals spend less time on housework when they manage their 
earnings independently, compared with when their partners manage part or all of the 
couple’s earnings. 
Meanwhile, earners may not be able to “buy out” or “opt out” of housework if they 
have no or limited access to their own earnings or little say in household financial decisions, 
however much they earn (Pahl, 1995). Therefore, individual earnings may confer 
autonomous power only when individuals can access and mobilize their earnings and control 
household financial decisions (Vogler, 1998, 2005). We thus expect the distinct modes of 
financial management and decision making, respectively, to moderate the influence of 
individual earnings on one’s housework time, as specified in Hypotheses 3B and 3C. 
Hypothesis 3B: Individual earnings have a greater effect in reducing one’s housework 
time when one manages part or all of one’s earnings, compared with when one’s 
partner manages one’s earnings. 
Hypothesis 3C: Individual earnings have a greater effect in reducing one’s housework 
time when one has greater control of household financial decisions. 
Gender Difference 
We have good reason to expect that women and men mobilize money in different ways to 
derive power and negotiate their housework participation. In the last few decades, women’s 
increasing participation in the labor force and the detraditionalization of gender ideologies, 
particularly in Western developed countries, have given them a greater sense of individual 
autonomy (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Gerson, 2009; Gupta, 2006, 2007; Killewald, 
2011; Scott et al., 2010). In contrast, due to their “lagged adaption” to women’s new gender 
roles, many men are still seen to hold on to the exchange model of gender specialization 
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(Brines, 1994; Bittman et al., 2003; Carlson & Lynch, 2017; England, 2010; Kan, 2008). As 
the social exchange model underscores the (gendered) division of paid and unpaid labor 
(Becker, 1991) and men still enjoy more favorable positions (e.g., higher wages) and 
opportunities (e.g., upward occupational mobility) than women in the labor market (England, 
2010; Gerson, 2009), men are likely to seek an advantageous bargaining position by relying 
on the social exchange models of resource bargaining and gendered resources, whereas 
women are likely to mobilize individual autonomy to maximize their own interests. 
METHOD 
Data and Sample 
The analysis drew on data from Waves 2 and 4 of the adult panel of the UKHLS, which were 
conducted from 2010 to 2012 and 2012 to 2014 respectively (Knies, 2016). The UKHLS is 
particularly suited to this research because it provides rich information on time use, earnings, 
and household financial organization. Only two waves were used, because key variables such 
as housework time, gender ideology, and financial decision making were measured only in 
Waves 2 and 4, and financial management was measured only in Wave 4. As the UKHLS 
incorporated sample members originally from the preceding British Household Panel Survey 
and over-sampled ethnic minorities as part of an ethnic boost, sampling and design weights 
were used throughout the analysis (Knies, 2016). 
The analytical sample was first limited to continuously cohabiting or married 
heterosexual couples from Waves 2 and 4 in which both partners were of prime working age 
(20–59)—i.e., older than 19 at Wave 2 and younger than 60 at Wave 4 (n = 7,717 couples). 
Although computer-assisted personal interviews were the major mode of data collection in 
the UKHLS, sensitive information on issues such as household financial organization and 
gender ideology was collected via a self-completion module to minimize social desirability 
bias. As only a representative subsample took the self-completion module, the eligible 
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sample was then restricted to 6,423 couples. A further 353 couples were excluded because 
one or both partners had provided missing or invalid information on key variables such as 
housework time, earnings, or financial organization. The results of Little’s missing-
completely-at-random test confirmed the randomness of the list-wise deletion of the 353 
couples (Li, 2013). The final analytical sample comprised 6,070 couples, as described in 
Table 1. For simplicity, I refer to Waves 2 and 4 of the survey as T1 and T2 hereafter. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Analytical Approach 
The key analytical aim was to examine the influence of money—earnings, financial 
organization, and their interaction—on the housework participation of male and female 
partners. However, it was also important to account for the potential reciprocal relationship 
between earnings and housework (Carlson & Lynch, 2017). Following the human capital 
perspective (Becker, 1991), scholars have found that housework participation may negatively 
influence one’s earnings in the labor market (Cooke & Hook, 2018). If so, ordinary least 
squares regression may depress standard error, increasing susceptibility to Type I error 
(Carlson & Lynch, 2013, 2017). Although fixed-effects panel regression with lagged 
variables accounts for unobserved endogeneity, the limited number of suitable waves of data 
rendered the fixed-effects approach implausible (Bollen, 2012).  
To account for unobserved endogeneity and reverse causality, I used the instrumental 
variables 2SLS modeling approach (Bollen, 2012). The models were built on four sets of 
variables (Bollen, 2012): (1) outcome variables (housework time of women and 
men	[𝐻𝑊%&]); (2) endogenous variables (individual earnings [𝐼𝐸%&*+,-./-0] and relative 
earnings [𝑅𝐸%&*+,-./-0]); (3) instrumental variables (𝐼𝑉); and (4) exogenous variables, 
including financial organization measures (𝐹𝑂%&) and covariates (𝐶𝑉). The first stage 
involved regressing each endogenous variable on the IVs and covariates. With the presence 
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of two endogenous variables, two first-stage models were estimated, as specified in 
Equations (1) and (2). In the second stage, individuals’ weekly housework time at T2 was 
regressed on the predicted values of the endogenous variables (𝐼𝐸%&6,789:7-0 and 𝑅𝐸%&6,789:7-0) 





        
(3) 
 The IV 2SLS models were estimated using the “ivreg2” function in Stata (Baum, 
Schaffer, & Stillman, 2010), which allowed the three equations to be estimated jointly to 
obtain corrected standard errors. The models were built in three steps for women (Model A) 
and men (Model B) separately. Model 1 included the main effects of all of the variables. In 
Model 2, separate slopes for individual earnings and relative earnings were estimated for 
distinct modes of financial management. In Model 3, separate slopes for the earnings 
variables were estimated for different modes of financial decision making.  
Weekly Housework Time 
The survey asked the respondents to report the time they spent per week on routine 
housework at T2, including chores such as cooking, cleaning, laundry, ironing, and grocery 
shopping, but excluding care provision. Although this stylized measure may be less accurate 
than time-diary measures, Kan and Pudney (2008) found that the associated report errors 
were largely random. The measure was top-coded at the 99th percentile to minimize the 
influence of outlier cases. On average, women (M  = 14.08) spent more than twice as much 
time than men (M = 6.05) on housework (t = 60.74, p < .001), mirroring the statistics (Mwomen 
= 14.23, Mmen = 5.60) obtained from time-diary data in the UK (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016). 
Endogenous Variables: Individual and Relative Earnings 
IET 2
Observed = β1IV + β2CV +α1 + ε1
RET 2
Observed = β3IV + β4CV +α 2 + ε2
HWT 2 = β5IET 2
Estimated + β6RET 2
Estimated + β7FOT 2 + β8FOcv +α3 + ε3
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The survey measured individuals’ monthly gross income in British pounds. Whereas net 
income may vary according to pension and tax arrangements, gross income comprehensively 
measures individuals’ socio-economic standing and earning power. To account for its skew 
distribution, the measure was top-coded at the 99th percentile and log-transformed in all of 
the statistical models. The average monthly gross income of men (MT1 = £2,620, median = 
£2,190; MT2 = £2,710, median = £2,280) was considerably higher than that of women (MT1 = 
£1,530, median = £1,300; MT2 = £1,540, median = £1,310; tT1 = 38.37, tT2 = 39.34, p < .001 
for both). One’s relative earnings were calculated as the proportion of the couple’s total 
earnings represented by individual earnings. An average man in the UK contributed around 
60% of his couple’s gross income at both T1 and T2. 
Household Financial Organization 
In a self-completion module, individual respondents were asked to describe the management 
of the household finances between partners only at T2. The response categories were as 
follows: (1) “we share and manage our household finances jointly”; (2) “I look after the 
household’s money except my partner’s spending money”; (3) “my partner is given a 
housekeeping allowance; I look after the rest of the money”; (4) “my partner looks after all of 
the household’s money except my personal spending money”; (5) “I am given a 
housekeeping allowance; my partner looks after the rest of the money”; (6) “we pool some of 
the money and keep the rest separate”; (7) “we keep our finances completely separate”; and 
(8) “I have some other arrangement”. I deleted a small number of couples (some of the 353 
couples eliminated during data cleaning) in which one or both partners had other financial 
arrangements. As the housekeeping allowance and personal spending money systems, which 
indicate a lack of control over family finances (Pahl, 1989; 1995), accounted for fewer than 
4% of the cases, I recoded the original categories into four groups: pooling (1; 48% for both 
women and men); female whole-wage (women reported 2 and 3, 23%; men reported 4 and 5, 
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24%); male whole-wage (women reported 4 and 5, 17%; men reported 2 and 3, 18%); and 
independent (6 and 7; 12% of women and 10% of men).  
The respondents were also asked to indicate who had the say in their households’ 
financial decisions. The responses were recorded using four categories: (1) “the respondent”, 
(2) “the respondent’s partner/spouse”, (3) “both partners/spouses have equal say”, and (4) 
“other”. After eliminating couples who had chosen the “other” option (17 of the 353 couples 
eliminated by listwise deletion during data cleaning), the original categories were recoded as 
“female control” (1 for women, 15%; 2 for men, 12%), “joint control” (3 for both women, 
68%, and men, 70%), and “male control” (2 for women, 17%; 1 for men, 18%). 
Instrumental Variables 
When analyzing panel data, it is common to use lagged measures as IVs (Bollen, 2012). In 
this research, the measures of individual and relative earnings at T1 were included as IVs for 
individual and relative earnings at T2. Lagged variables satisfy the first requirement of IVs, 
as they are associated with corresponding endogenous variables (Bollen, 2012). However, it 
is unclear whether they also satisfy the second requirement of IVs: to be uncorrelated with 
the error term of the equation. Therefore, informed by previous research (Cunningham, 
2001a, 2001b), I also included parents’ education as an additional IV for individual and 
relative earnings at T2. The variable was taken temporally prior to the endogenous variables, 
and it captured the highest education qualification achieved by the mother or the father, 
whichever was higher, using four categories: “no qualification” (47% for both genders), 
“school diploma” (19% for women; 20% for men), “post-school qualification” (23% for both 
genders), and “university degree or higher” (11% for women; 10% for men). Three tests were 
conducted (Bollen, 2012; Carlson & Lynch, 2017), which confirmed the adequacy of the IVs 
(see the findings section for test results): (1) the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood 
ratio (CCLR) test supported the relevance of the IVs; (2) the Hansen-Sargan test confirmed 
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that the IVs were uncorrelated with the error term; and (3) the Cragg-Donald test showed that 
the IVs strongly identified the models. Other IVs such as self-employment and 
homeownership were used in previous research (Carlson & Lynch, 2013, 2017), but they did 
not pass all of the three tests to qualify as adequate IVs in this research. 
Covariates 
The respondents’ age was included as a linear regressor, as earlier tests have shown this to be 
the most parsimonious solution. At T2, the women averaged 43.22 (SD = 9.87) and the men 
averaged 45.23 (SD = 9.73) years old (t = 35.40, p < .001). I included dummy variables for 
one’s own and one’s partner’s ethnic minority status (7% for both genders; Kan & Laurie, 
2016). I took account of whether the respondents and their partners, respectively, had 
obtained a degree after high school. A larger proportion of the women (40%) than the men 
(36%) were degree holders (χ2 = 9.28, p < .01). Each partner’s weekly paid work time was 
measured and calculated in the same way as their housework time. On average, the women 
spent 20.77 hours and the men spent 28.82 hours on paid work per week (t = 30.68, p < .001). 
As poor health limits one’s ability to perform housework, I controlled for the respondents’ 
and their partners’ self-reported health, recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from (1) “good” 
to (5) “poor”. The scale was reversed so that a higher score indicated a better state of self-
perceived health. 
I also controlled for the respondents’ gender ideology. The respondents were asked to 
report on a 5-point scale, ranging from (1) “strongly agree” to (5) “strongly disagree”, the 
extent to which they agreed with the following statements: “a pre-school child is likely to 
suffer if his or her mother works,” “all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-
time job,” “both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income,” and “a 
husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family.” I reversed 
the scales so that a higher score indicated a more egalitarian gender ideology. Factor 
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analysis—Varimax rotation and the Bartlett method—was used to extract the gender ideology 
index, which formed a single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.66 and a Cronbach’s α of 0.66.  
At the couple level, I distinguished between unmarried cohabiting and married 
couples (83%). The presence of children may increase housework demand. I thus controlled 
for the number of children younger than 16 in the household, using a categorical variable: 
“none” (48%), “one” (20%), “two” (22%), and “three and above” (10%). I also controlled for 
the age of the youngest child in the household. The use of domestic outsourcing was captured 
using a dummy variable indicating whether a couple used third-party help with routine chores 
such as grocery shopping, cooking, housekeeping and laundry (4%). Apart from age, marital 
status, ethnicity, self-reported health, information on children and domestic outsourcing, 
which were measured at T2, lagged T1 measures were used for the other covariates to 
account for potential reversal in causality (Carlson & Lynch, 2013, 2017).  
FINDINGS 
Descriptive Results 
Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the variation in the earnings of women and men with partners’ 
modes of financial organization. Panel A1 shows that high earners, particularly women, 
tended to manage their finances independently of their partners. As a result, the gender gap in 
partners’ relative earnings was smallest among couples who kept separate purses, compared 
with those who adopted other modes of financial management. This is consistent with Pahl’s 
(1990) and Vogler’s (1998) finding that the independent system requires both partners to be 
economically self-sufficient. In line with the traditional male-breadwinning and male-headed 
model of the household (Pahl, 1995), men were seen to manage the couple’s earnings when 
their female partners had low individual earnings and made a relatively small contribution to 
the couple’s income. On average, women who managed their own earnings independently 
earned nearly twice as much as their counterparts from families in which men managed the 
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couple’s earnings (£2,151 vs. £1,187). Panel A2 shows that as women earned less and their 
male partners earned more, control over household financial decisions shifted from females 
to males, via joint control. Similarly, the gender gap in relative earnings was wider when men 
rather than women controlled their households’ financial decisions. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 Panel B of Figure 1 depicts partners’ modes of financial organization across the 
quartile rank of relative earnings. The pooling system was consistently adopted by nearly half 
of women and men across the distribution of relative earnings. It is worth noting that a 
sizable number of couples adopted the female whole-wage system even when the female 
partners’ relative earnings were low (19.8% of women in the 1st quartile and 20.6% of men in 
4th quartile of relative earnings); and a not-small proportion of couples adopted the male 
whole-wage system even when the female partners’ relative earnings were relatively high 
(9.1% of women in 4th quartile and 9.1% of men in 1st quartile of relative earnings). Panel B2 
shows that the majority of couples made joint financial decisions, irrespective of relative 
earnings. There was a positive association between relative earnings and control of household 
financial decisions (Spearman’s rwomen = 0.20, rmen = 0.19). Despite their low level of 
contribution to the couple’s income, 8.7% of women and 10.5% of men from the bottom 
quartile of relative earnings still controlled the couple’s financial decisions. 
As depicted in Panel C of Figure 1, women spent considerably more time on 
housework than their male partners across all modes of financial organization. Specifically, 
as depicted in Panel C1, women’s housework time varied little across the pooling (M = 
14.47), female whole-wage (M = 14.46), and male whole-wage (M = 14.42) systems of 
financial management. In contrast, consistent with autonomy theory (Gupta, 2006, 2007; 
Bennett, 2013), women who managed their earnings independently spent less time on 
housework (M = 11.38). Panel C2 shows that for women and men alike, housework time was 
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negatively associated with control of household financial decisions. Compared with women 
who controlled household financial decisions (M = 13.85), women whose male partners 
controlled such decisions spent more time on housework (M = 15.23). Men spent less time on 
housework when they controlled household financial decisions (M = 5.41), compared with 
when their female partners controlled these decisions (M = 6.96). 
Multivariate Results 
 Table 2 presents the estimates from the 2SLS regressions. The results of the Anderson 
CCLR test for under-identification confirmed the relevance of the IVs, as the χ2 indices were 
sizable and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The Cragg-Donald test for weak 
instruments also showed that the IVs strongly identified the models, as the F-values were 
well above the Stock-Yoko threshold of 13.97 for three IVs (Stock & Yogo, 2005). The 
Hansen-Sargan over-identification test determines if at least one of the IVs is correlated with 
the error term (Bollen, 2012). As the χ2 indices were small and not statistically significant at 
the 10% level, the results did not reject the null hypothesis that the IVs were uncorrelated 
with the error term. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
In keeping with previous research, the results of Models 1A and 1B showed that 
women’s housework time was influenced predominantly by their individual earnings rather 
than their relative earnings (Gupta, 2006, 2007; Killewald, 2011; Carlson & Lynch, 2017), 
whereas relative earnings rather than individual earnings were primarily responsible for 
shaping men’s housework time (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Kan, 2008). The model fit 
indices showed that the inclusion of financial organization measures improved the overall 
model fit for both women (log-likelihood χ2(5) = 23.79, p < .001) and men (log-likelihood 
χ2(5) = 24.30, p < .001), over and above individual and relative earnings. The results thus 
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highlighted the role played by intra-household financial organization in directly shaping the 
housework time of both women and men. 
 For the main effects of household financial management, Hypothesis 2A (gendered 
resources theory) instead of 1A (resource bargaining theory) was supported: compared with 
couples who jointly managed the household finances, both women (–1.21 hours per week) 
and men (–0.54 hours per week) spent less time on housework when their partners managed 
the couple’s earnings. This is consistent with Pahl’s (1990) argument that the management of 
household finances often represents a time-consuming chore and may be associated with 
other housekeeping responsibilities. Hypothesis 3A, derived from autonomy theory, was 
partly supported, as women who managed their earnings independently spent 0.72 hours less 
on housework per week than those who jointly managed household finances with their 
partners.  
For the main effects of household financial decision making, the results lent partial 
support to Hypothesis 1B: compared with couples who made joint financial decisions, men in 
control of financial decisions spent 0.44 hours less on housework per week; and men spent 
0.61 hours more on housework per week when their partners controlled these decisions. 
However, the association between financial decision making and housework time was not 
statistically significant for women at the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the variation in the impact of earnings on housework time 
with the mode of financial management. Supporting Hypothesis 3B derived from autonomy 
theory, the results of Model 2A showed that women’s individual earnings reduced their 
housework time when they had partial (i.e., pooling system, B = –2.28, p < .05) or full access 
(i.e., female whole-wage system, B = –2.74, p < .05; independent system, B = –2.67, p < .05) 
to these earnings, but not when their male partners managed all of the couple’s earnings (B = 
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–1.29, ns). The findings thus confirmed the implicit yet untested premise of autonomy theory: 
that women’s derivation of autonomous power from their earnings is conditional on their 
capability to access these earnings. 
 The results of Model 2B supported both Hypothesis 1C (resource bargaining theory) 
and Hypothesis 2B (gendered resources theory): men’s relative earnings were associated with 
a reduction in their housework time when they managed part (i.e., pooling system, B = –6.27, 
p < .01) or all (i.e., male whole-wage system, B = –8.64, p < .001) of the couple’s earnings as 
well as when they handed over their earnings to their partners (i.e., female whole-wage 
system, B = –9.18, p < .001). These results suggested that men rely on both control-oriented 
bargaining and cooperation-oriented gender specialization to derive power from relative 
earnings. Unsurprisingly, given that both resource bargaining theory and gendered resources 
theory are predicated on the assumption of social exchange between partners (Blood & 
Wolfe, 1960; Zuo & Bian, 2001), relative earnings played little role in shaping men’s 
housework time when partners kept separate purses (i.e., independent system, B = –1.82, ns). 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the variation in the influence of earnings on housework 
time with the mode of household financial decision making. As shown in Model 3A, 
Hypothesis 3C derived from autonomy theory was supported, as the negative impact of 
women’s individual earnings on their housework time was particularly strong when the 
women controlled the families’ financial decisions (B = –3.48, p < .05). This impact 
decreased in size while remaining statistically significant when partners had joint control of 
the families’ financial decisions (B = –2.26, p < .001), but reduced further in size and became 
statistically non-significant when the male partners controlled these decisions (B = –1.30, ns). 
Supporting Hypothesis 1D developed from resource bargaining theory, the results of Model 
3B showed that men’s relative earnings reduced their housework time when they had full (B 
= –7.96, p < .01) or partial (B = –7.00, p < .001) control of household financial decisions, but 
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not when their female partners controlled these decisions (B = –5.50, ns). These findings 
suggest that control of money plays an important role in shaping the influence of earnings on 
the housework time of both women and men.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
A wide range of sensitivity tests based on alternative samples, measurement codings, and 
model specifications and with additional control variables were conducted to ensure the 
robustness of the results. First, more restrictive samples in which both partners were aged 
between 25 and 54 and engaged in paid work were analyzed, yielding consistent results. 
Second, for the financial management measure, it was not clear what exact proportion of 
earnings each partner contributed to the joint pool when the response “we pool some of the 
money and keep the rest separate” was recorded. However, the positioning of this option 
close to “we keep our finances completely separate” and distant from “we share and manage 
our household finances jointly” means that it may have been understood by the survey 
respondents to denote a high level of independence between partners. This was confirmed 
through additional analysis: the results reported in this article were robust to the exclusion of 
the above option from the “independent system” of financial management. Third, the results 
for the interactions between earnings and the financial organization measures were robust to 
fitting main-effects models by subsamples separated by the mode of financial management 
and financial decision making, respectively. Fourth, I experimented with controlling for 
additional covariates such as migration status, migrant generation, and religious affiliation. 
As these variables were collinear with ethnicity and gender ideology, they were excluded 
from the final analysis. 
DISCUSSION 
Despite the increase in women’s labor force participation and progress toward gender 
equality in the public sphere over the last several decades, gender inequality in the domestic 
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sphere persists in many countries (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Hu & Yucel, 2018). A long 
tradition of scholarship focused on the role played by economic resources in configuring 
marital power (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994; Gupta, 2007; Rodman, 1972). As marital 
power is crucial to the negotiation of housework performance in couple relationships, 
resource theories have fertilized sustained scholarly efforts to examine the relationship 
between money and gendered housework (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Carlson & 
Lynch, 2017; Chesley & Flood, 2017; Gupta, 2006, 2007; Killewald, 2011). 
Nevertheless, such efforts have suffered from a major limitation: money has been 
conceptualized and operationalized as a unidimensional construct in terms of earnings 
(Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Carlson & Lynch, 2017; Gupta, 2006, 2007; Kan, 2008; 
Killewald & Gough, 2010; Killewald, 2011; Usdansky & Parker, 2011). Although much has 
been written about the intra-household economy and its inequalities in couple relationships 
(Bennett, 2013; Himmelweit et al., 2013; Pahl, 1989, 1990, 1995; Pepin, 2019; Vogler, 1998, 
2005), we still know little about whether and how the distribution, management, and control 
of one’s own and the couple’s earnings shape the gendered housework participation of 
women and men. Seeking to fill this gap, this research re-examined the relationship between 
money and housework by interrogating the role played by household financial organization in 
shaping the housework time of women and men and in moderating the influence of earnings 
on housework.   
The results showed that the organization of household finances is both distinct from 
and as important as the generation of earnings in shaping conjugal power, in that financial 
organization had a net impact on housework time. Although scholars have long emphasized 
the multifaceted nature of intra-household finances (Pahl, 1989, 1995; Vogler, 1998, 2005; 
Bennett, 2013), it was unclear whether and how distinct aspects of financial organization may 
entail different consequences for conjugal power. This research remedies this important gap 
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by distinguishing the roles played by financial management and financial decision making in 
shaping partners’ housework time. On the one hand, in line with Pahl’s argument (1990, 
1995) that everyday financial management represents an onerous chore in itself and often 
correlates with involvement in other housekeeping tasks, both women and men spent less 
time on housework when their partners managed household finances. Supporting autonomy 
theory, however, women’s management of their own rather than the couple’s earnings 
reduced the time they spent on housework. On the other hand, men’s control of household 
financial decisions reduced the time they spent on housework. As high-earning women were 
more likely to take control of household financial decisions than their low-earning 
counterparts, the absence of a statistically significant link between control of financial 
decisions and women’s housework time may have been due to the correlation between 
women’s control of financial decisions and their earnings.  
The findings also showed that resource generation in the labor market and resource 
organization in the household operated jointly rather than separately in constructing conjugal 
power. Financial management can be an onerous chore in itself and one partner may not be 
able to directly derive power from managing the couple’s earnings. Nevertheless, managing 
the household’s finances may indirectly enable individuals to derive relative or autonomous 
power from the money they manage to negotiate their housework participation. Extending 
existing resource theories (Becker, 1991; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994; Chesley & 
Flood, 2016; Gupta, 2007; Rodman, 1972), I found distinct intra-gender mechanisms that 
power around financial organization interacts with relative earnings in shaping the housework 
time of men, yet it interacts with individual earnings in shaping that of women. Conjugal 
power is not merely the result of individual characteristics and intra-household dynamics 
(Yodanis & Lauer, 2007), it is also embedded in broader social and institutional contexts 
(Cherlin, 2010). The findings imply a tale of two genders in the evolvement of couple 
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relationships in the UK. Whereas men hold onto a communal model of family as they derive 
power from resource monopolization or exchange predicated on relative earnings (Cherlin, 
2010), women tend to benefit from an individualized model of couplehood as they derive 
power from mobilizing their individual resources (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). 
The findings more specifically reflect on the mechanisms underpinning the social 
exchange and resource theories of marital power and gendered housework participation. The 
salience of relative earnings to the generation of marital power and housework performance 
is largely predicated on the exchange relationships between partners in unitary couple units 
(Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Becker, 1991). However, this premise has generally been assumed 
rather than empirically tested. Earnings provide only a roundabout proxy of resource 
dependence between partners. I have demonstrated that the analysis of financial organization 
provides direct evidence of the behavioral enactment of exchange or its lack in couple 
relationships. My findings show that the role of relative earnings in shaping men’s 
housework time is conditional on the literal transfer or sharing of earnings between partners.  
The observation that men who contribute a larger share to the couple’s earnings spend 
less time on housework is not new (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Carlson & Lynch, 
2017; Kan, 2008). However, explanations of this observation are less conclusive. As the 
theories of resource bargaining and gendered resources similarly predict that relative earnings 
reduce one’s housework time (Becker, 1991; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Tichenor, 1999; Zuo & 
Bian, 2001), the two theories have seldom been empirically distinguished in prior research, 
despite their substantively different mechanisms of operation. In this research, the analysis of 
household financial management made it possible to disentangle the two theories by tracing 
the distinct directions in which money flowed between partners. I discovered that both 
theories were operative, instead of just one or the other. Consistent with resource bargaining 
theory (Becker, 1991; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Rodman, 1972), men’s relative earnings helped 
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them to “bargain out” of housework when they managed the couple’s earnings. Supporting 
gendered resources theory (Tichenor, 1999; Zuo & Bian, 2001), men’s relative earnings also 
helped them to “exchange out” of housework by handing over the management of the 
couple’s earnings to their female partners. 
Shedding new light on previously untested premises of autonomy theory, the findings 
also challenge the taken-for-granted assumption that individual earnings may readily confer 
marital power and automatically enable women to “opt out” or “buy out” of housework 
(Gupta, 2006, 2007; Killewald & Gough, 2010; Killewald, 2011). Existing theories have 
underlined the importance of individual resources in bolstering marital power and thus 
reducing housework time, particularly for women (Gupta, 2006; Usdansky & Parker, 2011). 
However, my findings clearly show that individual earnings obtained from paid work are 
only the starting point for women’s development of individual autonomy. I have 
demonstrated that to “opt out” or “buy out” of housework, it is insufficient for women to 
merely participate in paid work. Rather, they also need to be able to access their earnings 
(through financial management) and control these earnings (by influencing financial 
decisions). Killewald and Gough (2010, p. 997) found that in the US, individual earnings had 
a stronger negative association with housework time among women with lower earnings. 
They explained that individual earnings may not lead to a reduction in housework time 
among high-earning women, because “they have already stopped performing household tasks 
that are the easiest and cheapest to outsource or forego.” However, my findings suggest that 
low-earning women in the UK, who are expected to benefit most from their individual 
earnings (cf. Killewald & Gough, 2010), are often prevented from translating these earnings 
into a reduction in housework time by a lack of access to and control of their earnings. 
The limitations of this research suggest a few cautions in interpreting the results and 
important directions for future work. I did not examine gender display theory or gender-
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deviance neutralization theory, because reliable estimates were not attainable with the 
inclusion of an endogenous quadratic term for relative earnings in the 2SLS models (cf. 
Carlson & Lynch, 2017). The strength of the 2SLS approach hinges on assumptions such as 
correct model specification and adequacy of IVs (Bollen, 2012). For example, biased 
estimation may arise from unobserved variables and misspecification of time lags (Carlson & 
Lynch, 2017). The reliability of results from 2SLS models are also susceptible to the 
correlation between IVs and equation error terms and weak IVs (Bollen, 2012). Although the 
appropriateness of my IV and model choices were informed by theory and supported by 
statistical tests, scholars could usefully replicate the analysis and verify the findings using 
new instruments and datasets. Although the reliability of stylized time-use measures in the 
UKHLS is substantiated by both prior research (Kan & Pudney, 2008) and comparison with 
time-diary data (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016), it would be particularly beneficial to collect and 
analyze time-diary data alongside measures of household finances, which will provide more 
fine-grained insights into the temporal dynamics of housework, for example, on work vis-à-
vis nonwork days (Chesley & Flood, 2017).  
The analysis was necessarily limited to a two-wave framework, because the measure 
of household financial management was included only in Wave 4 and the measures of 
housework time and gender ideology were included only in Waves 2 and 4 of the UKHLS to 
date. Going forward, it will be crucial to collect comparable and regular waves of data on 
household financial organization to enable fuller longitudinal analysis. Such analysis will 
also benefit from a larger sample size and a richer set of measures of household finances. Due 
to cell-size constraints, I was unable to test the interaction between financial management and 
financial decision making or the three-way interaction of earnings, financial management, 
and financial decision making. Future researchers are encouraged to consider whether 
financial management and decision making operate in conjunction, rather than in isolation, in 
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shaping the influence of earnings on conjugal power. Although this research focused on the 
intra-household flow, management, and control of income in the UK, future efforts should be 
made to extend this focus to include savings, assets, and human capital (Bennett, 2013; 
Sullivan & Gershuny, 2016) and take account of variation in intra-household dynamics across 
different institutional and social contexts (Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). 
Despite its limitations, however, the research clearly demonstrates the need to move 
beyond wage and earnings to explore the important role played by intra-household financial 
organization in the relationship between money and marital power. As complex social 
processes such as financial management and decision making intervene in the relationship 
between earnings and housework, these processes present potential “barriers” to the 
translation of women’s labor force participation and market earnings into gender equality at 
home. Therefore, scholars and policy-makers are encouraged to consider money as a plural 
concept and take account of the ways in which household financial organization confers, 
distributes, and (re)balances power between partners (Bennett, 2013). To “unstall” the 
domestic gender revolution, this research refines resource theories by uncovering distinct 
intra-gender mechanisms underpinning the nuanced interactions between earnings, household 
finances and marital power for women and men. Nonetheless, the existence of a sizable 
residual gender gap in housework time also calls for continued efforts to go beyond the 
resource perspective in order to complete the domestic gender revolution. 
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FIGURE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS, RELATIVE 
EARNINGS, HOUSEWORK TIME, AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION, BY GENDER 
 
  
Note. N = 6,070 couples. In Panel B, N ≈ 1,517 for each equal quartile. Mean values reported in Panels A and C. 
In Panel A1, statistics at the end of bars indicate relative earnings. As relative earnings were calculated from the 
individual reports from women and men respectively, and also due to rounding, the percentages of women’s and 
men’s reports may not add up to 1. 1 British pound ≈ 1.58 US dollars in 2013. Weighted statistics.  
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics (N = 6,070 couples) 
   Women  Men 
Characteristic Min. Max. 
Mean 
/Percentage SD  
Mean 
/Percentage SD 
Key variables        
Weekly routine housework time (hour), T2 a b 0 50 14.08 8.98 
 
6.05 5.28 
Individual earnings (£1,000), T2 a b 0 11.60 1.54 1.25 
 
2.71 1.99 
(Median)   (1.31)   (2.28)  
Relative earnings, T2 a 0 1 .40 .17 
 
.60 .17 
Mode of financial management, T2        
















Mode of financial decision making, T2        
Female control 0 1 .15   .12  
Joint control 0 1 .68   .70  
Male control 0 1 .17   .18  
Covariates        
Age, T2 a 22 59 43.22 9.87 
 
45.23 9.73 




Liberal gender ideology, T1 a –2.72 2.95 0.11 0.71 
 
0.02 0.70 




Weekly paid work time (hour), T1 a b 0 60 20.77 15.36 
 
28.82 17.77 
Self-reported health, T2 1 5 3.60 1.04  3.56 1.02 




Number of children in household, T2 c   
     
None 0 1 .48   –  
1 0 1 .20   –  
2 0 1 .22   –  
3 and above 0 1 .10   –  
Age of youngest child, T2 c d 0 15 6.12 4.63  –  




Instrumental variables   
     
Individual earnings (£1,000), T1 a b 0 11.60 1.53 1.23 
 
2.62 1.97 
(Median)   (1.30)   (2.19)  
Relative earnings, T1 a 0 1 .41 .17  .59 .17 
Parents’ education, T1   
     
No qualification 0 1 .47   .47  
School diploma 0 1 .19   .20  
Post-school qualification 0 1 .23   .23  
University degree or higher 0 1 .11   .10  
Note. For dummy variables, 0 = No and 1 = Yes. SD = standard deviation. Mean values reported for continuous 
variables and percentages reported for dummy variables. Column percentages may not add up to 1 due to 
rounding. 1 British sterling pound ≈ 1.58 US dollars in 2013. Weighted statistics with unweighted sample size.  
a Gender difference significant at the 1‰ level and below, based on two-tailed chi-squared test for categorical 
variables and t-test for continuous variables. b Top-coded at the 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of 
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Table 2. Two-stage least squares regression models predicting weekly routine housework 
time of women and men (N = 6,070 couples) 
 1A: Women  1B: Men 
Predictor B  RSE  B   RSE 
Individual earnings (log), T2  –2.29*** 0.57  –0.44 0.33 
Relative earnings, T2  –3.01 1.80  –6.96*** 1.24 
Financial management (ref = pooling), T2 
 
    
Female whole-wage  0.31 0.28  –0.54** 0.17 
Male whole-wage  –1.21*** 0.32  0.22 0.18 
Independent  –0.72* 0.30  –0.30 0.22 
Financial decision making (ref = joint  
control), T2 
     
Female control  0.04 0.33  0.61** 0.23 
Male control  0.26 0.31  –0.44* 0.18 
Age, T2 0.12*** 0.01  0.05*** 0.01 
Ethnic minority (ref = no) 1.22** 0.49  0.01 0.31 
Partner ethnic minority (ref = no) 1.24* 0.47  –0.30 0.28 
Liberal gender ideology, T1 –0.36* 0.18  0.40*** 0.11 
Partner’s liberal gender ideology, T1 –1.11*** 0.17  0.17 0.11 
Has a degree (ref =no), T1 –0.78** 0.25  0.43** 0.16 
Partner has a degree (ref = no), T1 –0.97*** 0.25  0.30 0.16 
Weekly paid work time, T1 –0.09*** 0.01  –0.00 0.00 
Partner’s weekly paid work time, T1 –0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Self-reported health (high = good), T2 –0.01 0.12  0.04 0.07 
Partner’s self-reported health (high = good), T2 –0.12 0.12  –0.50*** 0.07 
Married (ref = cohabiting), T2 0.62* 0.28  –0.27 0.19 
Number of children in household  
(ref = none), T2 
     
1 2.90*** 0.41  1.30*** 0.25 
2 4.43*** 0.37  1.59*** 0.23 
3 and above 7.11*** 0.49  2.35*** 0.29 
Age of youngest child, T2 –0.07 0.04  –0.06** 0.02 
Domestic outsourcing (ref = no), T2  –2.15*** 0.43  –0.68* 0.28 
Intercept 12.75*** 1.21  9.58*** 0.84 
Anderson CCLR χ2  868.24***   871.47***  
Hansen-Sargan χ2 4.16   5.95  
Cragg-Donald Wald F 432.87***   419.59***  
χ2 (financial management) 23.39***   14.58**  
χ2 (financial decision making) 0.77   14.08***  
R2 (without financial organization measures) .211   .077  
R2 (full model) .223   .082  
Note. RSE = robust standard error. CCLR = canonical correlation likelihood ratio test for under-identification. 
T1 = time 1, wave 2 of the UKHLS. T2 = time 2, wave 4 of the UKHLS. Weighted statistics.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3. Two-stage least squares regression models testing the role of financial management 
and financial decision making in moderating the influence of individual and relative earnings 
on housework, by gender (N = 6,070 couples) 
Panel A: Moderated by mode of financial 
management, T2 
2A: Women  2B: Men 
B  RSE  B  RSE 
Individual earnings (log), T2      
Pooling –2.28* 0.93  –0.80 0.50 
Female whole-wage –2.74* 1.20  –0.03 0.71 
Male whole-wage  –1.29 1.36  0.12 0.70 
Independent –2.67* 1.14  –0.93 0.93 
Relative earnings, T2 
  
   
Pooling –1.95 2.60  –6.27** 1.91 
Female whole-wage –2.56 3.71  –8.64*** 2.39 
Male whole-wage  –4.70 5.09  –9.18** 2.86 
Independent –4.99 4.23  –1.82 3.49 
      
Panel B: Moderated by mode of financial 
decision making, T2 
3A: Women  3B: Men 
B  RSE  B  RSE 
Individual earnings (log), T2      
Female control –3.48* 1.54  –1.49 1.11 
Joint control –2.26*** 0.67  –0.36 0.39 
Male control –1.30 1.51  –0.00 0.73 
Relative earnings, T2      
Female control –1.50 5.12  –5.50 3.79 
Joint control –2.35 2.09  –7.00*** 1.43 
Male control –5.73 4.66  –7.96** 3.06 
Note. RSE = robust standard error. T2 = time 2, wave 4 of the UKHLS. Models included all other variables 
reported in Table 2—the results of which changed little from those reported in Table 2. Weighted statistics. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
